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United States v. McCane: Judge Tymkovich Questions
Heller’s Disarming Dicta
I. INTRODUCTION
Just how far does the Supreme Court’s recent holding in District
of Columbia v. Heller1 go to protect what it deems to be the
individual right to bear arms for self-defense? In Heller, the Court
states that “nothing in our opinions should be taken to cast doubt
on longstanding prohibitions on the possession by felons.”2 The
Tenth Circuit recently challenged this now famous dictum in United
States v. McCane,3 in which the criminal defendant, charged with
being a felon in possession of a handgun, asserted that Heller’s
individual right to bear arms invalidated the constitutional basis of
the felon dispossession law.
Though McCane’s conviction was upheld, the concurring
opinion of Judge Tymkovich illustrates a growing scholarly and
judicial dissatisfaction with Heller’s ostensibly unprincipled
exceptions. This Note addresses both the holding in McCane and the
broader question of whether the exceptions articulated in Heller can
be sustained in light of the Court’s recognition of an individual right
to bear arms.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
On the evening of April 18, 2007, Officer Aaron Ulmann, of the
Oklahoma City Police Department, observed Markice Lavert
McCane, a convicted felon, straddling two eastbound lanes of a fourlane highway in Oklahoma City.4 The officer followed McCane for
three city blocks before stopping McCane for violating state traffic
law and because the officer suspected McCane was intoxicated.5
Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer asked McCane for his
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
Id. at 2816–17.
United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037 (10th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 1039.
Id.
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license and insurance information, whereupon McCane informed the
officer that he was driving under a suspended license.6 The officer
then requested that McCane accompany him to his patrol car.
McCane complied with the officer’s request.7 Upon exiting the
vehicle, McCane was subjected to a pat-down search and was then
placed in the back seat of the patrol car.8 McCane’s driver’s-side
door remained open for the duration of the stop.9
With McCane in the back of the patrol car, the officer performed
a records check, confirming that McCane’s license was suspended
and that the car he was driving was not registered to him.10 The
officer arrested McCane, placed him in handcuffs, and summoned a
towing service to tow the vehicle.11 He then returned to the car and
asked McCane’s passenger, Joseph Carr, to accompany him back to
the patrol car. The officer then searched the car.12
In the pocket of the driver’s-side door, hidden underneath a rag,
the officer found a .25 caliber pistol with seven rounds of
ammunition in the magazine.13 The officer brought the weapon to
the patrol car to secure it, and, upon seeing the gun, McCane said,
“I forgot that was even there.”14 The officer then advised McCane of
his Miranda rights15 and transported him to the police station for
booking.16 While in police custody, McCane declined to make any
further statement.17 The officer cited McCane for driving with a
suspended license and for straddling lane lines.18 McCane was then
charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for being a felon in possession
of a firearm.19
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
16. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1039.
17. United States v. McCane, No. CR-07-286-C, 2008 WL 2740926, at *1 (W.D.
Okla. July 10, 2008) (“Defendant said that he understood his rights, but he refused to waive
his right to counsel and to talk to the officer about the incident.”).
18. Id.
19. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1040. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) states:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person—(1) who has been convicted in
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B. Procedural History

McCane sought to suppress both his inculpatory statement (“I
20
forgot that was even there”) and the gun. He began by arguing
that Officer Ulmann’s traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment
and therefore any evidence from that stop was inadmissible.21 The
argument proceeded as follows: In United States v. Botero-Ospina,22
the Tenth Circuit adopted the rule that “a traffic stop is valid under
the Fourth Amendment if . . . based on an observed traffic violation
or if the police officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that
a . . . violation . . . is occurring.”23 Further, under the Supreme
Court’s decision Terry v. Ohio,24 the reasonableness of McCane’s
stop must be (1) “justified at its inception” and (2) “reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference
in the first place.”25 McCane claimed that road construction at the
time of his traffic stop warranted deviation from his lane.26 He
further argued that the statutory prohibition against departure from
one’s lane in Oklahoma grants the driver a degree of discretion,
allowing drivers to depart from their lane when reason and safety
require them to do so.27 In short, McCane argued that “rather than
being a careless, reckless driver [McCane] was being most careful
and prudent.”28 McCane claimed that because he was driving in a
any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year; . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or
possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to
receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported
in interstate or foreign commerce.
20. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1040.
21. Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress at 11, McCane, 2008 WL
2740926 (W.D. Okla. July 10, 2008) (No. CR-07-286-C), 2008 WL 6807798.
22. United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995).
23. Id.; see Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress, supra note 21, at 8.
24. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
25. Id. at 20.
26. Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress, supra note 21, at 2 (“The
officer claimed that the basis for the stop was straddling the eastbound center lane line for
three blocks. This ‘alleged offense’ by the officer’s description occurred in the construction
areas which affected the lane position of every driver.”).
27. Id. at 6; see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 11-309(1) (West 2009) (“A vehicle
shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane.”) (emphasis added).
28. Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to Suppress, supra note 21, at 11. In
support of this proposition, McCane cited a Tenth Circuit decision interpreting an almost
identical Utah law. In Unites States v. Gregory, the Tenth Circuit stated, “We do not find that
an isolated incident of a vehicle crossing into the emergency lane of a roadway is a violation of
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reasonable manner and in compliance with the law, the traffic stop
was not justified at inception, and thus violated McCane’s Fourth
Amendment rights.
McCane likewise sought to suppress his statement, “I forgot that
was even there,” by claiming that the statement was involuntary and
coerced.29 McCane noted that the government is prohibited from
using any coerced statement against him.30 In order to determine
whether a statement is coerced, courts must consider “the totality of
all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the
accused and the details of the interrogation.”31 McCane contended
that because the officer placed McCane in a squad car and then
presented McCane with the gun prior to reading him his Miranda
rights, the officer had elicited McCane’s statement through “[s]ubtle
psychological isolation coercion.”32 Because the officer elicited this
statement in such an ostensibly insidious form of coercion, the
statement, argued McCane, ought not to be admitted.
District Judge Robin J. Cauthron issued the court’s decision on
July 10, 2008, upholding in every particular the government’s
33
charges against McCane. With regard to McCane’s contention that
his statement was psychologically coerced, Judge Cauthron stated
that “[h]aving heard and considered the parties’ evidence, it is clear
that the government has met its burden of showing that Defendant’s
statement was voluntary.”34 She credited Officer Ulmann’s testimony
that McCane “spontaneously uttered this statement in the absence of
questioning” and concluded that “[u]nder the totality of the
circumstances, Defendant’s statement was not the result of
coercion.”35
The court likewise dismissed McCane’s contention that the
traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment stating, “it is clear that
Officer Ulman had an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion to
Utah law. . . . [T]he statute requires only that the vehicle remain entirely in a single lane ‘as
nearly as practical.’” 79 F.3d 973, 978 (10th Cir. 1996).
29. Defendant’s Brief in Support of Jackson-Denno Hearing at 3, United States v.
McCane, 2008 WL 2740926 (W.D. Okla. July 10, 2008) (No. CR-07-286-C), 2008 WL
6807799.
30. Id.; see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1977).
31. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
32. Defendant’s Brief in Support of Jackson-Denno Hearing, supra note 29, at 2.
33. McCane, 2008 WL 2740926, at *1–*4.
34. Id. at *2.
35. Id.
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undertake a traffic stop.”36 As to McCane’s claims that road
construction necessitated his lane deviation, Judge Cauthron
observed that “Officer Ulman, who has extensive experience with the
area of Oklahoma City where Defendant was pulled over, testified
that while currently there are road construction zones on N.E. 23rd
Street, there was not construction underway in this area on the night
of April 18, 2007.”37
As to the officer’s warrantless search of McCane’s car, the court
observed that the search “did not violate the Fourth Amendment, as
it was a search incident to lawful arrest.”38 Under the “longstanding”
search incident to lawful arrest (“SILA”) exception, “the
government is entitled to a contemporaneous reasonable search
which may extend to objects under the arrestee’s immediate
control.”39 Further, this exception applies to “containers found
within an arrested defendant’s vehicle as well as the passenger
compartment.”40 Importantly, under the then prevailing Fourth
Amendment regime of New York v. Belton,41 officers were permitted
to rely upon the SILA exception, even after a suspect had been
restrained.42 Thus, because McCane’s statement was not viewed as
having been coerced, because the officer had an articulable reason to
pull McCane over, and because the search of McCane’s car was
lawful under the then prevailing understanding of the SILA
exception, McCane’s statement and the gun and ammunition found
by Officer Ulmann were admitted into evidence; McCane was
convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).43 McCane then appealed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
36. Id. at *3.
37. Id.
38. Id. at *4.
39. Id. (citing Malone v. Crouse, 380 F.2d 741, 744 (10th Cir. 1967)).
40. Id. (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–61 (1981)).
41. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
42. McCane, 2008 WL 2740926, at *4 (citing United States v. Brothers, 438 F.3d
1068, 1073 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Belton rule applied when the search was
conducted within a few minutes of the defendant’s lawful arrest and the defendant had not yet
been removed from the scene)).
43. Judge Cauthron’s decision did not address McCane’s contention that the element of
movement through “interstate commerce” had not been established. See McCane, 2008 WL
2740926. Presumably the judge found the evidence presented by the government to be
sufficient. See Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Quash and Dismiss
Indictment, McCane, 2008 WL 2740926 (No. CR-07-286-C), 2008 WL 6807800 (6807798
is the Defendant’s Motion).
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C. Interim Decisions
Significant to the trial court’s determination of the admissibility
of evidence against McCane was the determination at trial that a
warrantless search of a suspect’s car conducted while the suspect was
handcuffed in the back of a patrol car was subject to the SILA
exception. Of course, it goes without saying that the constitutional
validity of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was likewise essential for
upholding McCane’s conviction. While McCane’s conviction was up
for appeal, the United States Supreme Court issued two opinions
that called into question both of the propositions above.
1. Arizona v. Gant44
The first of these was Arizona v. Gant,45 in which the Supreme
Court reexamined its holding in New York v. Belton.46 In Belton, the
Court held that “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial
arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger
compartment of that automobile.”47 The Court applied this rule
despite the fact that the defendants had been removed from the car
and could not possibly have reached within the car to tamper with
evidence.48
The Gant Court further refined the rule introduced in Belton.
Like McCane, Gant was secured in a police patrol car prior to the
police conducting a search of his vehicle.49 The officers then searched
Gant’s car, finding both a gun and bag of cocaine.50 The Supreme
Court invalidated this search, stating that “[p]olice may search a
vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time
of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains
evidence of the offense of arrest.”51 Thus, because Gant was not
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment during the

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
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129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009).
Id.
453 U.S. 454 (1981).
Id. at 460.
Id. at 456.
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1715.
Id.
Id. at 1723.
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search, and because the evidence searched for was not related to
Gant’s arrest, the search of the passenger compartment violated the
Fourth Amendment.52
2. District of Columbia v. Heller53
In District of Columbia v. Heller,54 the Supreme Court struck
down several District of Columbia statutes generally prohibiting the
possession of handguns and requiring that lawfully owned firearms
be “unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar
device” unless they are being used for recreation or are in a place of
business.55 The Court ruled that “the District’s ban on handgun
possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its
prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home
operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense.”56 In so doing,
the Court abandoned a longstanding rationale of the Second
Amendment as a “collective” right. The Court stated that
“[n]owhere else in the Constitution does a ‘right’ attributed to ‘the
people’ refer to anything other than an individual right.”57 The
Court further stated, “[t]here seems to us no doubt, on the basis of
both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an
individual right to keep and bear arms. Of course the right was not
unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech was
not.”58
Among those limits upon the individual right to bear arms
sustained by the Court, albeit in dicta, is the prohibition on firearm
possession by felons. Perhaps anticipating that the recognition of an
individual right to bear arms would create a sea-change in Second
Amendment jurisprudence, the Heller Court stated that nothing in
its “opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.”59

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id. at 1723–24.
128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
Id.
Id. at 2783 (quoting D.C. CODE § 7-2507.02 (2001) (quotation marks omitted)).
Id. at 2821–22.
Id. at 2790.
Id. at 2799.
Id. at 2816–17.
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III. MCCANE IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
In light of the decisions above, McCane argued on appeal that
his conviction could no longer be constitutionally sustained. He
argued that “it would be improper to give less relief to Markice
McCane than to Rodney Gant,”60 noting that “[i]n essence once the
individual is handcuffed in the back of the police car it appears any
justification to conduct a search incident to arrest has ceased to
exist.”61 McCane contended that, because under Gant a
constitutional violation had occurred, the evidence obtained through
this violation ought to have been excluded in light of the
exclusionary rule.
McCane further argued that the Supreme Court’s complete
repudiation of the “collective right” understanding of the Second
Amendment in Heller, and its recognition of the individual right to
bear arms in self-defense, necessarily calls into question the
constitutional validity of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).62 He stated:
[I]t is important to stress the nature of the right being asserted
herein as a Constitutional right, which exists innately, which is
merely recited in, not provided by the Second Amendment.
Moreover, the language of the Second Amendment clearly states
this right “shall not be infringed.” This is an absolute prohibition,
clear in both language and meaning, leav[ing] no ambiguity to be
resolved.63

A. The Majority Opinion
The Tenth Circuit upheld the McCane conviction in every
particular. In response to McCane’s characterization of the Gant
ruling and the exclusionary rule, the Tenth Circuit observed that
“[t]he Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, but contains no provision
expressly precluding the use of evidence obtained in violation of its

60. Supplemental Response Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 12, United States v.
McCane, 573 F.3d 1037 (10th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-6235), 2009 WL 1433750.
61. Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 9, McCane, 573 F.3d 1037 (No. 086235), 2009 WL 1388417.
62. Amended Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 24–25, McCane, 573 F.3d 1037 (No.
08-6235), 2009 WL 108600.
63. Id. at 28.
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commands.”64 The court relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in
United States v. Leon, which created the “good-faith” exception to
the exclusionary rule in which courts decline “to apply the
exclusionary rule when police reasonably and in good faith relied
upon a warrant subsequently declared invalid.”65 Thus, the court
“decline[d] to apply the exclusionary rule when law enforcement
officers act in objectively reasonable reliance upon the settled case
law.”66
The court likewise made short work of McCane’s invitation to
call into question the validity of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In response
to McCane’s insistence that the dispossession law could not be
constitutionally sustained in light of Heller, the Tenth Circuit merely
responded by recapitulating the Heller dictum: “[N]othing in our
opinion” said the Heller Court, “should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.”67
B. Judge Tymkovich’s Concurrence
Judge Tymkovich wrote a separate concurrence, unwilling to let
a felony dispossession case pass by without observing the difficulty
created by Heller’s dicta. He cited two reasons for drafting a
concurrence: “The first is to note, given the undeveloped history of
felon dispossession laws, the possible tension between Heller’s
dictum and its underlying holding. The second reason is to express
concern that the dictum inhibits lower courts from exploring the
contours of Heller and its application to firearm restrictions.”68
As to the first concern, Judge Tymkovich observed that “the
felon dispossession dictum may lack the ‘longstanding’ historical
basis that Heller ascribes to it.”69 Though several scholars, cited by
Judge Tymkovich, had argued that felony dispossession laws have a
long and distinguished history,70 recent scholarship suggests that this

64. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 699
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
65. Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984)).
66. Id. at 1045.
67. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816–17 (2008).
68. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1047–48 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 1048.
70. See Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution or the Predilection of
Judges Reign?, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 65, 96 (1983); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and
the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 203, 266 (1983).
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historical characterization of such laws is incorrect.71 Judge
Tymkovich continues, observing that “[t]his uncertain historical
evidence is problematic in light of Heller’s Second Amendment
interpretation. Central to the Court’s holding are a detailed textual
analysis and a comprehensive review of the Second Amendment’s
meaning at the time of its adoption.”72
Next, Judge Tymkovich addresses his concern that the Supreme
Court’s “summary treatment of felon dispossession in dictum
forecloses the possibility of a more sophisticated interpretation of §
922(g)(1)’s scope.”73 Though Judge Tymkovich does not say so, this
is particularly true in the Tenth Circuit where the court considers
itself “bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by the
Court’s outright holdings, particularly when the dicta is recent and
not enfeebled by later statements.”74
Left unencumbered by what Judge Tymkovich refers to as “deus
ex machina dicta,” the lower courts may have been able to address
other questions unanswered by the Heller decision (e.g., whether
individual gun ownership for the purpose of self-defense should be
elevated to a fundamental individual right, to what level of
constitutional scrutiny will laws regulating such ownership be
subjected, etc.).75 This question has already sparked serious scholarly
debate.76
Finally, Judge Tymkovich observes that Heller has, at least
tacitly, undermined the holding of at least one Tenth Circuit
opinion. In United States v. Baer,77 the Tenth Circuit observed that

71. C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 695, 709–10, 714 (2009); id. at 698–713 (comprehensively reviewing the history of
state and federal dispossession laws); Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch 22, 56 UCLA L. REV.
1551, 1561, 1563 (2009).
72. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1048 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).
73. Id. at 1049.
74. Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot Corp., 531 F.3d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996)).
75. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1049–50 (“[T]he existence of on-point dicta regarding
various regulations short-circuits at least some of the analysis and refinement that would
otherwise take place in the lower courts.”).
76. Judge Tymkovich cites the following articles as illustrative: Carlton F.W. Larson,
Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1379–82 (2009); Marshall, supra note 71, at 728–31; Eugene Volokh,
Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and
a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443 (2009).
77. 235 F.3d 561, 564 (10th Cir. 2000).
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“the circuits have consistently upheld the constitutionality of federal
weapons regulations like section 922(g) absent evidence that they in
any way affect the maintenance of a well regulated militia.”78 If
18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) can only be upheld in light of a “collective
right” view of gun ownership like the one discredited in Heller, then
the governing rationale for the law in several circuits may have been
severely undermined.
V. ANALYSIS
Upholding the admission of evidence against McCane, even in
light of the Supreme Court’s subsequent holding in Gant rendering
the circumstances of Officer Ulmann’s search unconstitutional,
seems uncontroversial in light of the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule. Nothing in the facts of this case suggests that the
officer’s actions were taken in anything but “objectively reasonable
reliance upon the settled case law,”79 thus placing his actions squarely
within the good faith exception. Of greater interest in this case is
Judge Tymkovich’s concurrence, which illustrates the growing
judicial and scholarly dissatisfaction with Heller’s sweeping dicta
protecting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) from review.
A. Uneven Application: Violent v. Non-Violent Felons
Perhaps no one will lament Markice McCane’s inability to own a
gun. The trial court credited statements by the government that
McCane was a “multi-convicted felon and former gang member.”80
Judge Tymkovich observed that “[e]very individual right has
exceptions, of course, and the application of § 922(g) to a violent
felon such as Mr. McCane would appear appropriate under any
Second Amendment reading.”81 For this reason, even if the Tenth
Circuit were to ignore the dicta of the Supreme Court and question
the validity of § 922(g) in light of Heller, the present case is
undoubtedly an improper vehicle for doing so.
The concern with the felon dispossession law is not rooted in a
scholarly and judicial desire to see greater armament of violent
78. Id.
79. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1044.
80. United States v. McCane, No. CR-07-286-C, 2008 WL 2740926, at *1 (W.D.
Okla. July 10, 2008).
81. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1049.
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criminals. Rather, the Heller dicta comes under fire because
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) encompasses “non-violent felons as well,
permanently restricting their Second Amendment right to selfdefense.”82 The over-inclusiveness of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is
thrown into stark relief by examining the circumstances in which
criminals with a proven propensity to use firearms irresponsibly are
shielded from the statute’s lifelong ownership ban.
Consider first the case of nonviolent felons. Why would we think
that a tax evader, an embezzler, or someone who bribed a public
official would be more likely to commit acts of gun violence? . . .
And even with respect to violent criminals, the exception is
sweepingly broad. . . . [Further], there is the problem of gun
misconduct that does not rise to the level of a felony, such as
recklessly firing a gun into the air, or leaving a loaded firearm in a
location easily accessible to a child. These offenders have
demonstrated a prior misuse of firearms, but are not prohibited
from future possession.83

In light of Heller’s recognition of an individual right to bear
arms in self-defense, the application of § 922 seems uneven, as it
vitiates the self-protection right of those who pose no greater
apparent or empirically quantified risk of gun violence than nonfelons, while allowing those with a propensity to misuse firearms to
own them without impediment.
B. Orbiter Dictum
Having identified this apparent unevenness, Judge Tymkovich
laments his and any other court’s ability to call into question the
Heller dictum. Quoting Professor Lawson, Judge Tymkovich agrees
that “[a]lthough [Heller’s] exceptions are dicta, they are dicta of the
strongest sort.”84 As Judge Tymkovich notes, the Heller dictum is
particularly strong because it “is recent and not enfeebled by later
statements.”85
The McCane case thus illustrates a salient feature of Tenth
Circuit jurisprudence, i.e., the extraordinary deference the court
gives to Supreme Court dicta. Though other circuits treat Supreme
82.
83.
84.
85.

194

Id.
Larson, supra note 76, at 1380–81.
McCane, 573 F.3d at 1049 (quoting Larson, supra note 76, at 1372).
Id. at 1047 (quoting Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996)).
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Court dicta as persuasive authority,86 the Tenth Circuit’s view is
fairly sweeping: “[T]his court considers itself bound by Supreme
Court dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings.”87
Perhaps for this reason, Judge Tymkovich observes that “a number
of commentators have considered and proposed . . . the proper level
of constitutional scrutiny,”88 without articulating a view on what the
proper level of constitutional scrutiny should be. Though there
seems little question that McCane is an improper vehicle for
exploring the boundaries of the Heller dictum, it has nevertheless
invited criticism that may have been enhanced by a clear statement—
the first such statement by a federal appellate judge—as to what level
of constitutional scrutiny the right to bear arms for personal selfdefense merits. Judicial economy strongly favors a deferential posture
to Supreme Court dicta, preventing unnecessary challenges to the
settled views of the court. However, if Justice Scalia’s Heller dictum
must enjoy repose from lower court criticism, it must do so in direct
contradiction of Scalia’s prior statements. “Dictum settles nothing,”
said Justice Scalia, “even in the court that utters it.”89
C. Constitutional Scrutiny
Judge Tymkovich cites several scholars who have articulated
views on the level of constitutional scrutiny that restrictions on the
right to bear arms, post-Heller, ought to enjoy.90 The mode of
analysis in these papers has been to consider what level of scrutiny
would allow the Heller exceptions, while at the same time making
the District of Columbia handgun ban unconstitutional. However,
several of these scholarly efforts have focused not simply on
determining what the appropriate standard of review is, but on

86. Branigan v. Bateman (In re Bateman), 515 F.3d 272, 282 (4th Cir. 2008) (“We are
mindful that dicta of the U.S. Supreme Court, although non-binding, should have considerable
persuasive value in the inferior courts.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added);
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v.
Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 561 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Although the Committee is doubtless correct
that the Supreme Court's dicta are not binding on us, we do not view it lightly.”).
87. Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1996).
88. McCane, 573 F.3d at 1049.
89. Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 352 n.12 (2005).
90. See Larson, supra note 76, at 1379–82; Marshall, supra note 71, at 709–10, 714;
Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing After Heller: Of Standards of Scrutiny,
Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street Gangs, 41 URB. LAW. 1, 82–84
(2009); Volokh, supra note 76.
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“reverse engineer[ing]” what standard the Heller court applied to
both the individual gun right and its exceptions.91 At bottom, the
standard explored by these scholars was one in which the handgun
ban would be struck down while its exceptions, like the felon
dispossession law, would be upheld. This approach, while preserving
both the holding and dicta of Heller, seems unnecessary. The Heller
Court stated that “the Second Amendment conferred an individual
right to keep and bear arms” and compared this right to the First
Amendment right of freedom of speech.92 The Court further
acknowledged that “[t]he Constitution leaves the District of
Columbia a variety of tools for combating that problem, including
some measures regulating handguns . . . . But the enshrinement of
constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the
table.”93 Because the Heller Court elevates the Second Amendment
to the level of an individual right, it seems logical to conclude that
laws restricting that right ought be subjected to a heightened level of
scrutiny. This notion seems consistent with the suggestion of
footnote four of the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v.
Carolene Products, which states that “[t]here may be narrower scope
for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of
the Constitution, such as those of the first ten Amendments.”94 If,
for example, strict scrutiny were to operate upon laws regulating gun
ownership and use, then such regulations would have to be (1)
narrowly tailored in order to (2) serve a compelling government
interest. While there is little question that keeping guns out of the
hands of criminals in order to ensure public safety is a compelling
government interest, there is likewise little question that the absolute
ban on felon gun possession sweeps in non-violent felons unlikely to
misuse firearms, and excludes misdemeanants whose prior
convictions have already demonstrated their willingness to use
firearms dangerously.95 Consequently, the holding of Heller may, as
Judge Tymkovich suggests, call into question the validity of the
statutes supported by the Heller dictum. If gun ownership is to be
protected as an individual right and not a collective right, then the
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
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Larson, supra note 76, at 1372.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2799 (2008).
Id. at 2822.
304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (emphasis added).
Larson, supra note 76, at 1380–82.
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laws regulating gun ownership may have to be retooled to better
conform to Heller’s core holding.
VI. CONCLUSION
The recognition of an individual right to bear arms in the Second
Amendment represents a dramatic departure from a long-held view
that the Second Amendment creates a collective right. Enshrining
the Second Amendment as an individual right and not a collective
right may ultimately necessitate reevaluation of the rationales
supporting the lawful regulation of gun ownership and use.
Stephen C. Mouritsen
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